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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

GLENN G SHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

ASHLEY L. ROBISON,
Defendant-Appellant,
KOVO, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant,
vs.
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent.

Case No.
13823

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action pertaining to the sale of the assets
of KOVO, Inc., through a liquidating receivership established on petition of Plaintiff-Appellant Glenn C. Shaw
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due to a deadlock in the management of this corporation
which is the licensee of Radio Stations KOVO (AM) and
KFMC(FM), Provo, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Because of the complete and continuing failure of the
two equal, fueding shareholders of KOVO, Inc., to resolve
their deadlock, a liquidating receivership was established
by Court order upon petition of shareholder Glenn C.
Shaw to sell the corporate assets. Pursuant thereto a
formal, written offer of Respondent First Media Corporation (hereinafter "FMC") to buy Radio Stations KOVO(AM) and KFMC(FM) was accepted by the Lower
Court. Neither of the Lower Court's prior orders were
appealed. By Order dated August 16, 1974, the Lower
Court granted its appointed Receiver's Motion to approve
the form of the longer form agreement in the concluding
of the details of the transaction, which Order is on appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Lower Court's
Order dated August 16, 1974.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants have failed to set forth a complete Statement of F&cts in this matter, and it is believed that a more
full Statement of Facts in chronological sequence by the
Respondent will be helpful.
A. Commencement and Early Progress of Re-
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ceivership Proceedings (April, 1973 - Septemiber, 1973).
This action seeking the appointment of a Receiver
for the liquidation or sale of the assets of KOVO, Inc.,
was commenced by the filing of a verified Complaint
dated April 5, 1973, by Glenn C. Shaw (hereinafter
"Shaw"), a 50% shareholder and Vice President of
KOVO, Inc. (R. 3). The action was precipitated due tt>
a severe management deadlock and feud between Shaw
and the other 50% stockholder and President, Ashley L.
Robison (hereinafter "Robison") (R. 3,11). KOVO, Inc.,
is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission
as a trustee to operate Radio Stations KOVO (AM) and
KFMC(FM), Provo, Utah, pursuant to federal law in
the public interest (R. 11, 25; Tr., Sept. 6, 1973, pp. 28,
67; Exh. 7, Feb. 6> 1973 hearing).
In an Amended Complaint, Shaw alleged, inter alia,
that there was a deadlock in the management of the corporation with the two equal stockholders being unable
to agree on the appointment of a corporate director to
fill a vacancy on the three-man board (R. 11, 12, 15).
Shaw alleged further that serious differences existed between himself and Robison to the effect that "Unless a
receiver is appointed by the Court without delay irreparable injury to the corporation and to the plaintiff will
result" (R. 15). Numerous points of serious managerial
discord and intra-codporate warfare are set out in the
pleadings, including that ". . . Robison has purposely
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refused to make payments which are due and owing on
an equipment lease . . . and caused to be filed . . . a suit
in the United States District Court for Utah . . . ," the
hiring and discharging of " . . . an inordinately high number of employees," the tenuous relationship with the Intermountain Network due to "unreasonable acts" of Robison, failure to hold board meetings, and fundamental disagreements ronoerning finances, accounts and the direction of basic corporate policy (R. 12-14).
In an effort to restore corporate peace, the parties
appeared in Court on April 24, 1973, and it was there indicated that they had arrived at an interim solution (Tr.
April 24, 1973). This attempted accommodation failed,
and the feuding stockholders then attempted another interim arrangement, thus delaying the necessity of appointing a Receiver during the summer of 1973 (Tr. May
16, 1973). On May 24, 1973, Robison counterclaimed,
alleging that Shaw had breached the terms of his employment agreement with KOVO, Inc., had charged personal
expenditures to the corporation, ". . . received compensation substantially in excess of that authorized by the
Board of Directors . . . ," and had improperly disposed
of corporate assets (R. 48-50).
B. Liquidating Receiver Appointed by Court
Upon Petition of Appellant Shaw Because
of Renewed Failure of the Shareholders to
Resolve Corpoiialte Deadlock (September,
1973).
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The second interim arrangement for the corpoiration
also disintegrated in failure. At a hearing on August 31^
1973, Shaw strenuously urged the Court to appoint a Receiver, liquidate the corporation and sell the radio stations:
Mr. Martineau (Counsel for Shaw):
I might also say in the interim period there has
been an accounting worked out on most items
by the accountant, Mr. Sid Gilbert. Also there
have been contacts with people that might be
willing to buy the station and we have offers
in writing on that. Eventually this station has
got to be sold in order to be liquidated, since
these men cannot operate it together. There is
a deadlock. We want a receiver appointed so it
can be liquidated. We feel that we have bent
over backwards these three or four months in
permitting this thing to settle down and to be
given every opportunity (Tr. Aug. 31, 1973, p.
9). (Emphasis added.)
A hearing was set for September 6, 1973, to consider
the basic question of the appointment of a liquidating
Receiver. At this hearing, counsel for Shaw again urged:
. . . the issue before the Court now, that (there)
is a deadlock and a need for a receivership, the
record is clear and we feel that our motion is
meritorious and should be granted and the Court
should appoint a receiver forthwith and to take
in control the management of the affairs and the
records of this corporation with the view toward
a liquidation within the shortest time as prac-
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tkable. (Tr. Sept. 6, 1973, p. 58.)
added.)

(Emphasis

After full opportunity to present evidence, the Court
ordered on September 17, 1973, that Sidney Gilbert be
"• . . appointed as Receiver for the sale and liquidation
of the assets and business of the corporation . . ." and
that "The proceeds of sale of any property, asset or right
of the corporation shall be applied as provided in Section
16-10-93, U. C. A." (R, 106-108). (Emphasis added.)
The Court later observed that ". . . the only reason that
the Court is in this act under the corporation code is to
preserve the assets until it can be turned to cash or some
other assets." (Tr. Jan. 24, 1974, p. 17.) The Receiver
testified with regard to his understanding of the action
of the Court on September 17, 1973, that: "I believe
this was the order of the Court, was to sell the station,
and we set out to do that." (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 118.)
Neither of the contending equal shareholders appealed
the September 17,1973, order.
C. Court Administered Procedure to Liquidate
and Sell the Assets of KOVO, Inc., (Radio
Stations KOVO (AM) and KFMC(FM))
(September, 1973 - January, 1974).
1. FCC Approves Transfer of Corporate
Control to the Court Appointed Liquidating Receiver.
On October 10, 1973, the Receiver submitted an ap-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
plication (FCC File No. BTC-7267) to the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter "FCC") seeking
consent to the involuntary transfer of control of KOVO,
Inc.,, from the deadlocked equal shareholders to the Receiver (R. 349). In Exhibit No. 1 of the transfer application, the Receiver represented to the FCC that "the
ultimate aim of the receivership is to sell the going business . . ." FCC approval was granted on December 6,
1973 (R. 349, 405).
2. Formal Solicitation of Offers to Purchase
Radio Stations.
With respect to the liquidation and sale of the KOVO,
Inc. assets, the Court-appointed Receiver represented in
a written report to the Court on November 29, 1973,
that ". . . now that the financial statements have been
prepared, your Receiver intends to circularize all of such
interested purchasers and request written offers from
them on or before a fixed date" (R. 125). In compliance
with this procedure, and the order of the Court to sell
the stations, the Receiver solicited written offers from
third parties. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 118.) The Receiver
in fact did receive several competing written offers, including offers submitted by each of the shareholders,
Shaw and Robisoor\ and their investment partners, the
Respondent FMC, and two or three others, including the
Ross Davis and Brockbank offers (Tr. June 28, 1974,
pp. 119, 127.)
3. First Media Corporation (FMC) Suh-
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mits Written. "Highest and Best Offer"
(Containing Time Deadline for Acceptance,
Within the time schedule approved by the Receiver,
FMC transmitted a written offer dated January 15, 1974,
with a copy to the Court. (R. 126; FMC Exh. 1 and 2,
June 28, 1974 hearing.) This detailed four-page, singlespaced offer contained essential contract terms, such as
identification of the property to be purchased, price and
payment. The offer by its terms specified January 21,
1974, as the time deadline for acceptance. (FMC Exh.
1, June 28, 1974 hearing, p. 3.) However, it became
apparent that the Receiver would need more time beyond
the January 21, 1974, expiration date of the FMC offer
in which to consider and study all competing offers, and
thus FMC agreed by letter to extend the acceptance date.
(FMC Exh. 3, June 28, 1974 hearing; Tr. June 28, 1974,
p. 16.) On January 31, 1974, the Receiver petitioned the
Court for a hearing to consider and act upon offers received (R. 150). The Receiver's Motion stated that,
". . . your Receiver is of the opinion that the highest
and best offer received to date is one from First Miedia
Corporation (FMC) . . ." (R. 150). (Emphasis added.)
With respect to the deadlocked appellant shareholders, the Receiver indicated in his Motion that he had
". . . invited either Mr. Shaw or Mr. Robison to make
a bid to purchase the corporation, but no such bid has
been forthcoming as of this time from either of said per-
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sons" (R. 150). (Emphasis added.) Finally, on the day
of the evidentiary hearing to consider the written offers
(February 6, 1974), the Shaw group (including Shaw,
Murray Rawson and Ben W. Wilkerson) and the Robison
group (including Robison, Tim Thorny and William Hesterman) each submitted competing written offers which
were in fact filed beyond the deadline established for
other parties. (Exh. 8 and 9, Feb. 6, 1974 hearing; Tr.
Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 28 and 44.) Nevertheless^ the Court
did consider these offers along with the FMC offer at
the hearing on February 6, 1974, as is hereinafter more
fully set forth.
D. Complete Failure of Stockholders to Resolve
Corporate Deadlock and Settle Differences;
Robison's Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity and the AbCaTron Dispute (September 1973 - February 6, 1974).
From August 31, 1973, until the February 6, 1974,
evidentiary hearing held by the Lower Court on the competing offers to purchase submitted by the Shaw Group,
the Robison Group and FMC, the record in this liquidating receivership proceeding is silent regarding any settlement or attempted settlement of any kind between
Shaw and Robison. Rather, the adversary stockholders
remained deadlocked and pursued their own interests in
acquiring control of the assets of the corporation in competition with each other and with other interested parties
such as FMC, Ross Davis, Brockbank and others whose
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offers were solicited by the Receiver. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974.)
The continued adversary posture of the two equal stookholders was further manifest in the rise and final disposition in January, 1974, of the AbOaTron Corporate
opportunity matter involving the KOVO (AM) transmitter site. (Tr. Jan. 24, 1974.)
While serving as President and in a fiduciary capacity
as Director of KOVO, Inc., Robison acquired for himself
and not KOVO, Inc., an option to purchase some of the
indispensable parcels of land on which the KOVO (AM)
radio antenna tower and grounding system is situated.
Robison thereupon assigned his option to AbOaTron Corporation, which corporation then proposed to lease the
same land back to KOVO, Inc., for $3,000 per month
over a 20-year period. (R. 157-161; Exh. 10a, Jan. 24,
1974, hearing.) KOVO, Inc. could have acquired the land
for $50,000. (Exh. 2A, Jan. 24, 1974, hearing.) As Robison's assignee, AbCaTron would therefore receive a 72%
annual return on its investment at the expense of KOVO,
Inc. (R. 160).
Following an evidentiary hearing on January 24,1974,
the Court found ". . . that the deprivation of the Jacobsen Trust Property (transmitter site) and the removal
of the opportunity to obtain the property results in extreme hardship, irreparable damage, and perhaps devastating injury to KOVO, Inc." (R. 150). (Emphasis
added.) Because of defendant-appellant Robison's fiduciary relationship to KOVO, Inc., as a director and his direct involvement in securing the exclusive option on the
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transmitter land to the detriment and injury of KOVO,
Inc., the Court imposed a constructive trust on the option
(R. 161).
E. Evidentiary Hearing Relative to Submitted
Offers; Receiver's Report and Recommendation of FMC Offer; Court Acceptance of
FMC Offer (February, 1974).
1. Evidentiary Hearing on the Competing
Written Offers Submitted by the Shaw
Group, the Robison Group and FMC.
On February 6, 1974, the Court held a full evidentiary hearing at which legal representatives of Shaw, Robison, the investment partners of Shaw and Robison, and
FMC were invited to discuss, on the record, their clienlts,
competing offers to the Court. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 8,
28, 37.) Each party was carefully examined by the Receiver's attorney, the other counsel, and the Court, regarding the salient characteristics of their respective
offers and underlying qualifications. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974.)
The hearing record is absolutely devoid of any discussion
at this time by Shaw and Robison that they were trying
to reach some accord, as each formed an invesiement group
and submitted a competing written offer. (Tr. Feb. 6,
1974, pp. 28 and 37; Exh. 8 and 9, Feb. 6, 1974 hearing.)
At this February 6 hearing, the Court approved and
set into motion an exacting schedule wherein each of the
three competing offeror groups was given opportunity to
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submit any additional information so desired to the Receiver by February 11,1974. (Tr. Feb. 6,1974, pp. 46-50.)
During these proceedings the Receiver specifically requested that FMC hold its offer open for acceptance so
as to meet the stipulated timetable. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974,
pp. 47-48; Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 20-21):
MR. ROBERTS (Counsel for Receiver): . . .
and I would like to have the record reflect if it
can, Mr. Hardy, that your client is willing to hold
your offer open for that period of time.
MR. HARDY (Vice President, FMC): Yes,
and I will provide you with an appropriate instrument. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 47-48.)
Pursuant to the Court's schedule, Messrs. Richard E.
Marriott, Glen T. Potter and Ralph W. Hardy, Jr., officers and directors of FMC, directed a telegram to the
Receiver dated February 11, 1974, confirming the oral
agreement made in open Court to keep its offer open.
(FMC Exh. 5, June 28, 1974 hearing.)
2. Receiver's Written Report and Recommendation of FMC Offer.
In obedience to the schedule mandated by the Court
at the February 6,1974, evidentiary hearing, the Receiver
submitted his formal written Report and Recommendation to the Court for consideration on February 19, 1974
(R. 169). In his report the Receiver recommended the
FMC offer (R. 172).
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3. Court Acceptance of FMC Offer and
Communication of Acceptance to FMC.
By Order dated February 22, 1974, the Court accepted the offer of FMC:
The court having considered evidence presented in support of proposed offers of purchase
of KOVO, Inc., and having considered the report of the receiver herein concerning such offers,
and having considered the course taken by this
proceeding since its inception, it concludes that
the best interests of all parties herein would be
served in the most even handed and expeditious
manner by accepting the offer of F.M.C., Inc.
It is therefore ordered that the report and
recmnmendat&on of the receiver be accepted by
the court and filed in this proceeding, and that
the receiver proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C.,
Inc., and proceed with all reasonable dispatch
to conclude sale to that offeror.
Dated this 22nd day of February, 1974.
/ s / Alien B. Sorensen
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge
(R. 173.) (Emphasis added.)
A duplicate original of this acceptance order was mailed
direatly by the Court itself to Ralph W. Hardy, Jr., Vice
President and Secretary of FMC (FMC Exh. 8, June 28,
1974, p. 23.) Receiver's counsel also sent a separate copy
of the Court's order to Mr. Hardy. (FMC Exh. 9, June
28, 1974, hearing; Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 23-24.)
Robison's objection to the Court's February 22, 1974,
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acceptance order was denied by the Court after opportunity for a hearing cm March 15, 1974 (R. 180, 182-183).
No objection to the said order was filed by Shaw. Neither
the February 22, 1974, order, nor the March 15, 1974,
order denying Robison's objections was appealed by either
Shaw or Robison or their respective investment partners.
F« Formalization of Conforming Long Form
"Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of
Assets" Document and Detrimental Reliance of FMC. (February, 1974 - May, 1974.)
In confirmation of, and in express reliance upon the
Court's February 22, 1974, acceptance of FMC's timelimited offer, FMC commenced to prepare with the Receiver a conforming longer form "Agreement for the Sale
and Purchase of Assets." A draft of this long form,
which was conformed to and based upon the Court-accepted detailed written FMC offer, was expeditiously sent
by FMC upon request to the Receiver the latter part of
February, 1974. (Tr. June 28, 1974, hearing, pp. 49, 61
and 70.) Receiver afforded both Robison and Shaw an
opportunity to offer suggestions concerning the long form
(R. 186).
During this same period immediately following the
Court's acceptance of its offer, FMC engaged in other
activity to complete details in reliance on the Court's
mandate " . . . to conclude sale to (this) offeror" (R. 173).
Officers and directors of FMC came to Utah to undertake community surveys which are required to expedite
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the lengthy required F.C.C. approval for transfer of the
radio licenses. (Tr., June 28,1974, pp. 73, 78, 80-82.) One
of these was a "general public" survey, and the other a
"community leader survey/' (Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 8081.)
At this time, there was a pending lawsuit against
KOVO, Inc. by a very substantial creditor, Schafer Electronics Corporation, and with the encouragement and
approval of the Receiver after acceptance of its offer,
FMC held conferences, including a meeting in Washington, D. C. to assist in bringing this creditor matter to a
resolution. (Tr., June 28, 1974, pp. 27-29, 33-34; FMC
Exhibits 13, 14, June 28, 1974 hearing.) Because of the
Court acceptance of its offer, FMC determined not to
take further steps relative to another potential investment, the purchase of Radio Stations KBOI and KBOIFM in Boise, Idaho. (R. 88; FMC Exh. 19, June 28,
1974 bearing.) Without considering the lost investment
opportunity relative to the two KBOI stations, FMC
expended $18,926.97 in the period of time following acceptance of its offer to expedite the concluding of the
matter in strict obedience with the Lower Court's February 22, 1974, acceptance order. (FMC Exh. 15, 17 and
18, June 28, 1974, hearing.)
G. Motion By Receiver to Approve the Long
Form "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of Assets" and Hearings Thereon.
(May, 1974 - July, 1974.)
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The Receiver filed a Motion dated May 11, 1974,
seeking approval of the long form "Agreement for the
Sale and Purchase of Assets" which had been prepared
pursuant to, and consistent with, the Court accepted FMC
written offer (R. 186). The Motion recited that "In the
opinion of the Receiver, the agreement (the long form
entitled, "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of Assets") (R. 189 et seq.) is consistent with the initial offer
and proposal filed by First Media Corporation in this
proceeding" (R. 186). This long form was described in
testimony by the Receiver's counsel as a ". . . 'flushing
(sic fleshing) out' or sort of compleiting the details" —
as the earlier written FMC offer ". . . had the basic dements . . ." (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 147-148.) This fact
was recited in the long form itself which was presented
to the Court by the Receiver:
WHEREAS, KOVO, INC. (through the Receiver
and with the approval of the Court dated February 22, 1974 . . . and FIRST MEDIA have
reached an understanding with respect to the
sale by KOVO, Inc. and the acquisition by
FIRST MEDIA of certain assets from KOVO,
Inc. (R. 190). (Emphasis added.)
The Court, in discussing the relationship between the
Court acceptance of PMC's offer on February 22, 1974,
and the long form agreement referred to the analogy of
of an earnest money receipt compared to the longer form
real estate contract. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 61.)
After the Receiver's May 11, 1974, Motion was filed,
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Shaw's attorney called the Receiver's attorney and asked
that hearing on the Motion be continued. The reason
given by counsel was that he would be unable to be
present at the hearing as presently scheduled, but that
he wanted to be present to support the Receiver's Motion. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 142, R. 408.)
A hearing on the Receiver's Motion was then reset
for May 24, 1974 (R. 260). Testimony of both the Receiver's counsel and Shaw's attorney indicate that Shaw's
attorney asked for yet another continuance on May 22
or 23. (Tr. July 2, 1974, p. 15,19.) At this time, the record is clear that there was still no final settlement, understanding or new offer involving Robison, Shaw or other
third party purchasers or financial backers. (Tr. July 3,
1974, p. 12.) Finally on either May 30, 1974, or May 31,
1974, with the hearing time delayed at Shaw's request
and the Receiver's Motion now set for June 7, 1974,
Shaw's attorney again called the Receiver's counsel to
tell him for the first time that major problems between
Shaw and Robison had been allegedly worked out. (Tr.
July 3,1974, p. 12.) A Motion to Terminate the receivership was not filed by Shaw and Robison, however, until
as late as June 5, 1974 (R. 266).
In light of these thirteenth-hour developments, and
to afford all a fair chance to be heard, the Court on June
6, 1974, rescheduled the hearing on the twice continued
Receiver's May 11 Motion for June 28, 1974. FMC petitioned for formal Intervention alleging that it had vested
contract rights which had ripened into existence dating
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back to the Court's action on February 22, 1974, accepting
its offer (R. 268, 282). FMC alleged that it was now
entitled to enter the action as a formal party to protect
its vested contract rights (R. 268-284). Both Robison
and Shaw filed pleadings consenting to such Intervention
(R. 296-98).
After a full evidentiary hearing on the Receiver's
May 11,1974, Motion on June 28,1974, and July 3, 1974,
the Court ruled that FMC's offer had in fact been accepted by it (the Court) through its own Order of February 22, 1974, and that the Receiver's May 1.1 Motion
should be granted!. The Court's Order along with its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed
August 16, 1974 (R, 400-410). No objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed by either
Shaw or Robison. However, both Shaw and Robison filed
notices of appeal from the said August 16, 1974, Order,,
which is the subject matter of this present appeal (R.
414).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT ORDERING COMPLETION OF THE SALE TO
RESPONDENT FMC WAS PROPER.
The Order of the Lower Court appealed from herein
states:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
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AND DECREED that the Receiver's Motion
dated May 11,1974, is hereby granted and thereby Receiver is authorized to execute the "Agreement For The Sale And Purchase of Assets" attached to said Motion, and to proceed with all
reasonable dispatch to do whatever is necessary
to conclude the sale relative to the assets of
KOVO, Inc. to First Media (R. 401).
A. The Lower Court Properly Held that It had
Accepted the Written Offer of FMC to Purchase the Assets of KOVO, Inc.
1. The Court Order of February 22, 1974,
Constituted Acceptance of FMC's Offer.
The facts in this case are easily distilled into the
basic contractual concept of an offer by FMC to purchase
the KOVO, Inc. assets, and acceptance of that offer by
the Lower Court:
The written offer of First Media was accepted
through order of this Court dated February 22,
1974, and in such a manner as to create a lawful
and enforceable contract. (Condusions of Law,
R. 409.) (Emphasis added.)
Throughout the entirety of their brief, appellants conveniently overlook this fundamental contractual concept
as well as principles of law and equity related to the
administration of judicial sales. For instance, at pages
42-43 of their brief, appellants argue that a bid accepted
by a receiver but not the Court does not give rise to the
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creation of a vested right and cite various references including 2 Clark on Receivers, § 519 at 835, and 50 C. J. S.,
Judicial Sales, § 22. What is completely ignored by the
appellants, however, is that the Lower Court itself did
accept the offer of FMC through its order of February
22, 1974, as made abundantly clear by its Conclusions of
Law, supra. Thus^ the law and procedure discussed by
the appellants throughout their brief was adhered to in
that the FMC, Shaw, and Robison offers were discussed
with both the Receiver and the Court on February 6,1974,
and then after the Receiver made his recommendation
the Lower Court took the separate and distinct step of
accepting the FMC offer, thereby giving judicial approval
to the sale (R. 401).*
*In attempting to avoid the consequences of the Lower Court's acceptance order of February 22, 1974, and contrary to fundamental
principles of appellate argument, the appellants argue facts which
are not in the record with respect to a hearing on March 15, 1974.
For instance, on page 35 of their brief they state: "At the March
15th hearing the Court expressly advised those present that he had
not approved any sale to the Intervenor and that he had only approved Intervenor's offer as a basis for negotiations." No citation
is given for such a statement in the record because it does not
exist. The record is clear that at the March 15 hearing, the Lower
Court denied the objections of Robison to the Court's February 22
Order (R. 182). In fact, one of the objections of Robison to the
February 22 order was that the Court's acceptance of the FMC
offer was "premature," thus indicating that Robison indeed believed
that the Lower Court accepted the F M C offer. (Appellants' Brief,
p. 14; R. 177.)
The appellant's unsupported assertion, supra, only compounds the
error in appellants' Statement of Facts. In the first full paragraph
on page 15 of their brief, appellants state that the Lower Court did
not dispute the contents of an affidavit of an attorney that was
proffered into evidence, the affidavit stating what the Court supposedly said on March 15. (There was no transcript for said hearing.) It is incredibly obvious that the Lower Court did not have
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Appellants make the novel argument at pages 25-28
of their brief that "acceptance" and "confirmation" of an
offer are two distinct acts required of a court in a judicial
sale. The authorities cited by appellants suggest that the
requirement may exist that where an offer is first accepted by a sale officer other than the court itself, such
as by a receiver, there may then be a requirement of
a separate "acceptance" or "confirmation" by the Court.
But there is absolutely no requirement for two acts where
the Court itself is the accepting officer. In Freebill v.
Greenfield, 204 F. 2d 907 (2 Ok. 1953) (cited by appellants, p. 41) this principle is clarified, as "confirmation"
by the Court was sought because the person actually
conducting the sale and receiving the bid or offer was a
trustee in bankruptcy. The acceptance or confirmation
by the Court was not a second act by the Court., but its
only act of acceptance following the first action of the
* Continued.
to disagree with the contents in the affidavit, as the affidavit was
not admitted into evidence. (Tr. July 3, 1974, p. 3.)
FMC indicated to the Court by way of direct refutation to what
appellants claimed the Court had said at the March 15, 1974, hearing that it had extensive notes that it would enter into evidence as
to what was said at the March 15 hearing. (Tr. July 3, 1974, p. 13.
See also Tr. June 28, 194, pp. 43-44.) This evidence was unnecessary
due to the failure of the appellants to put in any evidence as to
what the Court said. Appellants on page 15 of their brief say that
the affidavit of Robison's former attorney was "surprisingly not
admitted . . . " It was not admitted because having notice for nearly
two weeks of the hearing, they failed to produce Robison's former
attorney who lived in Provo and who attended part of the hearing
to testify in person subject to cross examination. Thus, the affidavit
in an evidentiary trial-type hearing was nothing more than rank
hearsay. To then argue in their brief something as being fact, which
is not in the record, goes beyond the bounds of appellate propriety.
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trustee. Of a similar vein is Morrison v. Burnette, 154 F.
617 (8 Cir. 1907) (cited in appellants' brief,, p. 41), wherein the two acts of acceptance and confirmation refer to
the sale officer first taking the bid and then the Court
cx>nfiraiing or accepting such:
• . . that the bidder at a sale by a master or receiver . . . buys subject to the confirmation or
avoidance of the sale by the count, (p. 263.)
Thus, the entire thrust of the appellants' argument is
misplaced as the Lower Court in this case did accept
or coofem the FMC offer by order separate from earlier
action of the Receiver.
2. The Lower Court Did Not Recognize or
Permit An "Alternative Approach," But
Rather Ordered Settlement and Sale to
FMC as Purchaser in Accordance With
Its Offer.
Appellants argue that until July, 1974, the Lower
Court had followed a procedure permitting an alternative
approach to the disposition of the stockholder dispute:
On the one hand, it appointed the Receiver to
manage the business and solicit bids from prospective buyers. On the other hand, it gave forceful encouragement to the parties to settle so that
a sale would be unnecessary. This dual approach
to a resolution of the problem is consistent with
all action taken by the owners, their counsel, the
Receiver and bis counsel and by the Court itself

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
throughout the proceedings until July, 1974. (Appellants' Brief, p. 29.) (Emphasis added.)
Not only is this self serving statement wholly unsupported by tho record, but, as a fundamental matter of
equity and the orderly conduct of judicial sales, any such
dual approach by the Lower Court would clearly constitute a fraud upon bona fide third-party purchasers. There
is no basis for such alleged schizophrenia and uncertainty
in the court order of February 22, 1974 (R. 173).
It is submitted that third persons who filed solicited
offers with the Court's Receiver in good faith, such as
the Ross Davis and the Brockbank groups and FMC, were
entitled to rely upon a bona fide judicial sale procedure.
These good faith offerors were entitled to rely upon orderly procedures and the assurance that they were not
engaged in a meaningless exercise in the event of acceptance of an offer by the Court itself. A fortiori, once
its deadlined offer was in fact accepted by the Court on
February 22, 1974, FMC was entitled to rely on the feet
that the Court or its Receiver would not inconsistently
later approve action which would nullify the Court's own
acceptance.* The record lends no support whatsoever
*At pages 9-10 of their brief, appellants include a quotation from
the February 6, 1974 transcript suggesting the Court was still encouraging settlement. First, it should be noted that the colloquy
quoted by appellants from the February 6 hearing is argued out of
context. The Court was suggesting that perhaps there could be
agreement as to which one of the three competing offers should be
accepted. Secondly, the three parties who made offers (FMC, Shaw
& Robison) did not agree as to which one should be accepted, and
the Court proceeded to take evidence so that it could make the
decision. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 2-6.)
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to the theory that the Lower Court was involved in the
duplicity of such an inconsistent approach after it ordered aooeptianoe of the FMC offer thereby creating
vested rights, supra.*
3. The Lower Court's Conclusion That
FMC Acquired Vested Rights Based
Upon Acceptance of the Original FMC
Offer is Consonant With Fundamental
Principl'es of Contract Law.
The Lower Court concluded that "Through acceptance of its written offer, First Media acquired vested
rights." (Conclusions of Law, R. 409.) Daum Construction Company v. Child, 247 P. 2d 817, 819 (Ut. 1952).
See also Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Ut. 313, 139 P. 2d 1002
(1943). In its written Ruling, the Court fully articulated
the fundamental principle that failure to recognize the
creation of vested rights in FMC ". . . would be unjust,
and would render proceedings under the pertinent statute
useless" (Ruling, R. 398).
FMC asserted in its June 7, 1974, Petition in Intervention that it ". . . acquired vested rights by reason of
proceedings which havce heretofore occurred, and failure
*The fact that the Court did not take such a dual approach is emphasized by a later order, dated March 27, 1974, wherein the Court
expressly ordered that all disputes between Glenn C. Shaw and
Ashley L. Robison regarding their ownership, financial disputes
". . . are hereby referred to Division One of this Court for trial
setting . . ." (R. 182). The Lower Court, by this order, stressed
again that it was involved in the sale with FMC at this point and
not the basic shareholder feud.
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to permit intervention would deny petitioner's rights including due process of law" (R. 268). Appellants inconsistently appear to have acquiesced in this position, both
Shaw and Robison having filed pleadings consenting to
the intervention (R. 296, 298).
Appellants suggest that because of the Receiver's
May 11, 1974, Motion seeking approval of the long form
"Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of Assets," FMC
acquired no rights through the Court's earlier acceptance
order of February 22 (Appellants Brief, p. 36). Such an
argument is patently contrary to basic contract law wherein it is not unusual for there to be a binding written agreement between parties on basic terms to be later expressed
is a longer, more detailed document. The preparation of
the longer form does not destroy the binding effect of
the shorter form. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.
2d 597 (Utah 1962); Phillips and Easton v. International,
512 P. 2d 379 (Kan. 1973). An example is the court suggested relationship of an earnest money receipt to the
longer real estate contract form:
COURT: Then what do you claim for the
contract that you now have submitted to the receiver?
HARDY (Vice President, FMC): What do
you mean what do I claim?
COURT: What is there in that contract —
is that conitraot any different that the offer in
January?
HARDY: In substance it is not different.
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There are flushing (sic fleshing) out of what
I would call basic first principles, boilerplate
language, representations of warranties, that sort
of thing that is in addition that would need to be
approved.
COURT: I am taking what you are trying
to express is analagous to an earnest money receipt in a final real estate contract. Is that what
you are talking about?
HARDY: I am not a real estate lawyer, but
I think that is fair. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 61.)
(Emphasis added.)
This characterization was also made by the Receiver's
counsel as he, too, said that the FMC offer "had the
basic elements." (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 147448.)
The last paragraph of the Lower Court's February
22 acceptance Order* plainly shows the intent of the
Court in taking such a bifurcated short form/long form
approach, i.e., (1) to first accept the written offer of
FMC, thereby binding the parties (with a comma inserted
before the "and," thus clearly breaking the thought) and
then (2) to proceed to finalize the transaction pursuant
to the terms of the accepted short form agreement. This
is consistent with the Court's concern about the expiration of FMC's offer expressed at the February 6, 1974,
hearing and shows a clear intent to bind FMC — thus
creating a ''bandar" like agreement so as to justify FMC
*"It is therefore ordered that the report and recommendation of the
receiver be accepted by the court and filed in this proceeding, and
that the receiver proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C., Inc., and
proceed with all reasonable dispatch to conclude sale to that offeror."
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and the Receiver expending time to prepare a more formal
long form agreement in conformance with the offer.*
A careful review of the detailed FMC offer shows
that it contains all material terms essential to the creation of a contract such as a description of what was to
be purchased, price and the procedures to complete the
transfer of KOVO, Inc.'s assets and business. (FMC Exh.
1, June 28,1974, hearing.) The FMC offer contained definite, certain and enforceable guidelines. Under the contract doctrine of mutuality, FMC could not have arbitrarily withdrawn from the transactiion. By the same token
the Receiver could no longer entertain other offers, e.g.,
such as the one attempted on behalf of Messrs. Robfeon,
Hesterman, Howard Bradshaw and/or American Savings
and Loan Association on May 31,1974, infra.
Recognition of the binding effect of a shprt form
* Indeed from appellants' suggestion that FMC's January 15 offer
was not accepted by the Court on February 22 and that it could
not be accepted until Court approval of the long form agreement
the absurd conclusion necessarily follows that FMC's time-deadlined January 15 offer must somehow still be open and that it can
be drawn down or otherwise snapped up by the Court at any time
and at its pleasure wholly beyond the control of offeror FMC. This
open ended acceptance condition obviously is not the case. FMC's
January 15 written offer was formally and deliberately extended
twice in order to accommodate the Lower Court's schedule for considering the Receiver's Report and Recommendation and the ultimate Court acceptance of an offer. As fully set forth in FMC's
offering documentations, as amended and on the record in this proceeding, such an open-ended offer was neither intended nor authorized by FMC. Prompt acceptance or rejection of its time-deadlined
offer was contemplated by FMC and the Court. Simply stated, it
was to be an "up" or "down" matter, as satisfied by the Lower Court
in its Acceptance Order of February 22, 1974.
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agreement, without reference to contemplated later formalization and detailed refinement thereof, and without
all of the traditional "boilerplate" language found in a
longer foirm is well supported in the law. In City Stores
Co. v. Ammerman, 226 F. Supp. 766 (Disk Ot. D. C.
1967), aff'd., 394 F. 2d 950 (D. C. Cir. 1968), plaintiff
sought specific performance of a letter agreement from
the defendant stating that the plaintiiff could be given an
". . . opportunity to become one of our . . . center's major
tenants with rental and terms at least equal to that of
any other major department store in the center." City
Stores, supra, at 770. Even though certain terms were
not spelled out in minute detail in the letter such as
building design and spedfications, the Court had no difficulty enforcing the agreement because such terms would
be ". , . within the customary contemplation of parties
entering into shopping center agreements of the type at
issue in this case" (p. 771). Walsh v. Rundktte, 9 D. C.
(2 Mac.) 114 (1875).
The Court in Morris v. Ballard, 56 U. S. App. D. C.
383; 16 F. 2d 175 (1926) upheld the efficacy of an option
to purchase property with a provision that the price was
to be "on terms to be agreed upon." Upon careful review
of the law, the Court held that thfe:
. . . was in good conscience a stipulation that he
would in fact agree with plaintiff upon reasonable terms of payment, and would not arbitrarily refuse to proceed with the sale . . . 56 App.
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D. C. 383, 384; 16 F. 2d 175, 176. (Emphasis
added.) *
In a similar vein is the California Supreme Court's
holding that "the contract . . . was neither illusory nor
lacking in mutuality of obligation because the parties
inserted a provision in their contract making plaintiff's
performance dependent on his satisfaction with the leases
to be obtained by him." Mattel v. Hopper, 330 P. 2d
625, 628-629 (1958). Likewise in Flncher v. Belk-Sawyer
Company, 127 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1961), the Florida Coint
held that:
The contract leaves to the future agreement
of the parties the establishment by the defendant
of a beauty consulting service, shopping service
and the amount of additional compensation based
upon the gross sales of the defendant's fashion
department, beauty consulting service and shopping service . . . We conclude that these provisions left for future agreement do not render the
remaining promises, which are definite and certain, unenforceable. 127 So. 2d at 132. (Emphasis added.)
The same approach is taken with insurance agreements
wherein there is a "phase 1." or "binder" agreement before issuance of a more formal and lengthy policy. Fisher
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 115 F. 2d 641 (7
Cir. 1940). Without question, FMC became bound and
by the same token acquired vested rights upon the ac*See also Roig V. Electrical Research Products, Inc., 57 F. 2d 639 (1
Cir. 1932).
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oeptance of its offer through action of the Lower Court,
and the best evidence of the intent of the Lower Court
to so bind FMC is its own Decision in August, 1974, that
it bad indeed accepted FMC's written offer (R. 409).
B. Shaw and Robison Failed to Settle Their
Differences Prior to the Lower Court's Acceptance of the FMC Offer, and the Purported Agreement of Shaw, Robison and
New Third Parties Over Three Months Later
Constituted an Untimely New Offer.
1. Shaw and Robison Failed to Settle Their
Differences Prior to the Acceptance of
the FMC Offer.
Throughout their Brief, appeUaots strain to argue
that they were somehow diligently working towards a
settlement culminating in the arbitrary rejection of the
purported settlement by the Lower Court. (Appellants'
Brief, p. 37.) A meticulous review of the record fails to
lend even a modicum of support to this bootstrap attempt
by the appellants to camouflage the salient fact that
contract rights vested in FMC upon acceptance of FMC's
time-deadlined offer by the Lower Court by order of
February 22, 1974.
As the factual chronology plainly shows, for several
months immediately after the receivership action was
filed in April, 1973, the feuding shareholders tried in vain
to resolve their deep discords with encouragement of set-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
tlement by the Lower Court (R. 59-60). However, it is
equally evident from the record thait these several early
attempts to bridge the everwidening gulf of stockholder
acrimony completely disintegrated, flaring into plaintiff
Shaw's concerted effort in August, 1973, to have a Receiver appointed to effectuate a sale of the KOVO, Inc.,
assets in the shortest time practicable:
MARTINEAU (Counsel for Shaw): There is a
deadlock.
We want a receiver appointed so it can be
liquidated . . . we have bent over backwards
these three or jour months in permitting this
thing to settle down . . . (Tr. Aug. 31, 1973,
p, 9; see also Tr. Sept. 6, 1973, p. 58.) (Emphasis added.)
In view of the marked intrasigence of the parties,
two interim settlement failures, mounting creditor claims,
lawsuits and the crippling deadlock of the corporate licensee of Radio Stations KOVO (AM) and KFMC(FM),
the Court finally acceded to Shaw's petition pursuant to
statutory provisions (U. C. A. § 16-10-93,e£ seq.) and
appointed a Receiver in September, 1973, ". . . for the
sale and liquidation of the assets and business" of KOVO,
Inc.* (R. 106-108). It is significant that neither of the
appellants appealed the Court's order of appointment.
*The appellants in their Statement of Facts at p. 5 suggest that at
this time (August 31, 1973) there appeared to be some possibility
of ". . . working out a buy-sell between the owners." This was, however, prior to the time of the full evidentiary hearing on the appointment of the Receiver, which was held on September 6, 1973.
Thus, what may have been "possible" on August 31 obviously failed,
as the appointment of a Receiver came in point of time after.
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Without any question as to the liquidating purpose of
this receivership, the Lower Court designed, approved
and set into motion and supervised a formal competitive
offering, acceptance and liquidating sale procedure. For
instance, in Exhibit No. 1 of an application for consent
to the transfer of control of KOVO, Inc. from the feuding
shareholders to the Receiver, it was represented to the
F.C.C. that "The ultimate aim of the receivership is to
sell the going business." (F.C.G File No. BTC-7267.)
(R. 349; 405). Then, in a report filed with the Court in
November of 1973, the Receiver stated that the financial
statements had been prepared and that he ". . . intends
to circularize all of such interested purchasers and request written offers from them on or before a fixed date"
(R. p. 125). It was in fulfillment of this Court-filed report that the Receiver directed form letters in mid-December, 1973 to interested third parties, including FMC, to
solicit written offers. Obviously, there was no "settlement" with these positive definite steps towards sale
being taken. A most revealing objective indication of the
still existent shareholder enmity in January^ 1974, was
the AbCaTron dispute. This attempt by Robison to gain
control of KOVO, Inc. through seizure of a corporate
opportunity was prohibited with the Court's Order not
being appealed (R. 151).
Appellants' assertion in their Statement of Facts that
". . . there were further discussions regarding settlement
. . . " but there was a "lack of sufficient financial backing"
finds no support in the record, and appellants failed to
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give any citations to the record in their brief in support
of the proposition. (Appellants' brief, p. 8.) The record,
as shown, supra, is entirely to the contrary*
2. The Court-administered P r o c e d u r e
Whereby the Court Accepted the FMC
Written Offer was Understood, Agreed
to and Participated in by Shaw and Robson.
The events during February, 1974, further emphasize
the utter failure of the appellants to settle their differences. At the February 6, 1974, evidentiary hearing the
three competing written offers made by FMC, Shaw and
Robison were received into evidence (Exh. 7, 8 and 9),
and the need for the Lower Court to either promptly
accept or reject the FMC offer was made very clear: *
MR. HARDY (FMC): . . . I do want to say one
other thing. We would be hopeful that this matter could be resolved as soon as possible. I was
hopeful that the stockholders would have been
able to submit their offers substantially ahead
of this, because we felt that we were under a
* Neither the Receiver's report nor any other document in the record
lends even the slightest support to the suggestion of the appellants
in their brief at page 35 that the FMC offer of $540,000 was at "dis
tress prices." Since appellants' competing offers were patterned after
FMC's, one could only assume then that theirs were also at "distress
prices." The record, however, just gives no support to such a thesis
suggested by appellants. It should be noted that the entire paragraph in their brief wherein this is "argued" cites no reference in
the record. This is an example of argumentative liberty which
pushes the bounds of reasonable credulity.
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deadline, as I understand other offerors have felt
they were under a deadline some time ago, and
we are just very anxious to get the thing wrapped
up, either our offer will be rejected or accepted
in the very near future.
COURT: And get onto something more profitable if it's rejected.
MR. HARDY: So we can get onto something
else. (Tr. p. 17.) (Emphasis added.)
A strict time schedule was set by the Court to accept
an offer, and both Shaw and Robison expressly agreed
to the procedure of holding no further bearings on the
specific issue of the acceptance of an offer:
THE COURT: Well, I am not even considering
the dispute between the shareholders.
MR. MARTINEAU: No, but I am saying this
would leave that pending without prejudice.
THE COURT: Yes. I
on that when I refer it
that issue. That won't
of Court. I don't want

intend to draw an order
to another Judge to try
be tried in this division
to hear any more of it.

MR. ROBERTS: One further thing I think,
Your Honor, the order should further provide
that all parties, recei ver and all offering parties,
are willing to waive the right to further hearing
with respect to —
THE COURT: On this petition that is before
me?
MR. ROBERTS: On that petition and with respect to the financial data to be admitted to the
receiver and the receiver's report for that matter.
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THE COURT: Any objection to that?
MR. MARTINEAU: That's stipulated.
THE COURT: Anything further from you?
MR. MARTINEAU: No.
THE COURT: Mr. Statt (Counsel for Ashley
Robison).
MR. STOTT: Nothing further and we will agree.
(Tr,, p. 48-49.) (Emphasis added.)
Leave was granted for the submission by February
11, 1974, of further written data relative to the respective competing offers, and the Court prescribed an exacting schedule for acceptance of an offer:
THE COURT: All right. I will leave it this
way. The Receiver may consider any additional
information provided him from any of the offerors, including your client, Mr. Hardy, provided
it is received, but it must be in his hands no
later than Monday morning February the 11th.
(Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, p. 49.)
*

*

#

MR, ROBERTS (Counsel for Receiver): And
I would like to have the record reflect if it can,
Mr. Hardy, that your client is willing to hold
your offer open for that period of time.
MR. HARDY (Vice President, FMC): Yes, and
I will provide yon with an appropriate instrument. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 47-48.)
In line with this agreement, FMC sent a telegrapm dated
February 11,1974, confirming that its written offer would
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be kept open long enough for the Court to accept or reject it under the schedule agreed to in open Court by all
parties:
Paragraph 10 of First Media Corporation offering letter dated January 15, 1974, is amended
as follows:
10. This offer shall remain open pursuant
to that schedule agreed upon among counsel and
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge,
in the District Court of Utah County, State of
Utah on February 6, 1974. (FMC Exh. 5, June
28,1974 hearing.)
Shortly thereafter the Court itself accepted the offer of
FMC through its Oder of February 22, 1974, supra (R.
173). After the appellants agreed to and participated in
the offering process, it would be unconscionable and contrary to all traditional notions of substantial justice and
fair play for the Court to not recognize the vesting of
rights in FMC.
3. The Purported Settlement Involving
Shaw, Robison, Hesterman and New
Third Parties (Howard Bradshaw and/
or American Savings and Loan Association) Over Three Months Following
Court Acceptance of the FMC Offer
was Merely an Untimely New Offer.
Between the date of the Lower Court's February 22,
1974, acceptance order and early June, 1974, the record
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establishes that there was no purported "seMement." In
fact, the Receiver and FMC ware engaged in conducting
the sale in line with the Court's February mandate, and
even as late as May, Shaw was in support of the Receiver's Motion. Shaw's counsel contacted the Receiver's
attorney in May expressly requesting that the hearing on
the Receiver's Motion be continued so that Shaw's attorney could be present to support the Receiver:
Q. (Greene, FMC Counsel): And is it true
that Mr. Martineau (Shaw's Counsel) contacted
you and said that he wanted a continuance of
the hearing because he couldn't be present and
wanted to come in and support your position?
A. (Roberts, Receiver's Counsel): I think
that is correct.
Q

That is to have it approved?

A. That is correct.
(Tr. July 3, 1974, p. 142.) (Emphasis added.)
Finally, in late May, 1974, after requesting two continuances of the hearing on the Receiver's motion, the
appellants circumvented the orderly judicial sale procedure they had agreed to and participated in, supra, so as
to have another chance to make a new offer which appellants attempt to characterize in their brief as a "settlement." William Hesterman, American Savings and Loan
and Howard Bradshaw were now part of this new deal
and offering arrangement:
MR. CONDER (counsel for Robison): I
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would like to make an appearance on behalf of
Mr. Robison and Mr,, Bill Hesterman.
THE COURT: Who is Mr. Bill Hesterman?
I have been trying to get rid of this case. It's
like honey on your hands. You can't get rid of
it. (Tr. June 7, 1974, p. 5.)
MR. CONDER: He is one of the people
who is working together with Mr. Robison to buy
Mr. Shaw's position and that is the position we
have worked to. Mr. Martineau and I have
worked diligently for the last ten days working
out an agreement so that we can buy Mr. Shaw's
position. (Tr., p. 5.) (Emphasis added.)
*

*

*

THE COURT: You are appearing on behalf
of Mr. Robison?
MR. CONDER: Mr. Robison and Hesterman and American Savings and Loan.
THE COURT: Where did they get into the
Act?
MR. CONDER: They keep expanding.
They're one of the parties involved in the purchase. (Tr. June 26, 1974, p. 2*) (Emphasis
added.)
It is abundantly clear that after failing to have their
earlier competing offers accepted by the Court in February, 1974, and not appealing the Lower Court's order
accepting the FMC offer, Messrs. Robison and Hesterman (the unsuccessful Robison Group) desired yet another chance to acquire the stations.
The Lower Court properly observed the longstanding
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doctrine obligatory to all liquidating receiverships that
vested rights of intervening third parties cannot be defeated. Thus, "In determining whether to continue a receivership or discharge a receiver, the court will consider
the rights and interests of all parties concerned," and will
not grant an application for discharge merely because it
is made by the party at whose insistence the appointment
is made. Looney v. Doss, 189 S. W. 2d 206 2n (Tex. 1945).
See also Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S. W. 2d 630 (Tex.
1949); Savings Trust Co. v. Skain, 131 S. W. 2d 566 (Mo.
1939). The protection accorded the intervening rights
of third parties was also recognized by the United States
Supreme Court holding that:
[T]he court. . . could, undoubtedly, at any time
before the rights of innocent purchasers had intervened, set the whole proceedings . . . aside.
But after the rights of such third parties have
intervened, its authority in that respect can only
be exercised consistently with protection to those
rights. Koontz v. Northern Bank of Kentucky,
83 U. S. 196, 202 (1873).*
To allow such a OTCumveotion of agreed to Court administered procedure, ". . . judicial sales would become
farces, and rational men would shim them and refuse to
bid, if after the confirmation unsuccessful bidders or dissatisfied litigants could avoid them and secure new sales
by offers of higher prices." Morrison v. Burnette, 154
*See also Philan V. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F. 2d 978, 991 (2
Cir. 1940); Barclay v. Pittsburgh Home Building Co., (Pa. Supp. Ct.
1914); Looney v. Doss, supra.
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P. 617, 625 (8th Cir. 1907) *. This Supreme Court has
likewise recognized this principle. Mark v. Nelson, 65
Utah 320, 237 Fac. 223 (1925).
Appellants' reference to Joseph Nelson Plumbing &
Heating Supply Co. v. McCrea, 64 Utah 484 231 P. 823
(1924), is completely misplaced. In that case, the Lower
Court made it clear that its own action for not accepting
a sale was not ". . . because somebody is disappointed or
dissatisfied," but because there was a bona fide misunderstanding as to what assets the bidders were making offers
for. (64 Utah at p, 486-487.) In the case at bar, there
is not a scintilla of evidence that Shaw or Robison did
not know what they were bidding on, and thus the Lower
Court did in fact properly and within its discretion take
the step of acceptance or ronfirmation. It properly recognized that there just was no cause such as fraud or the
like to justify not accepting the bona fide offer of FMC
and it is apparent that Shaw and Robison were merely
"disappointed" because neither of their offers were accepted and just wanted another chance over three months
later to make a new offer.
4. The New Offer of Appellants and Their
Investment Partners William Hesterman, Howard Bradshaw and/or Ameri* Appellants cite Morrison V. Burnette, supra, at page 41 of their
brief in support of the proposition that the rights of a bidder at
a receiver's sale do not vest until confirmation by the Court. What
the appellants totally ignore is that the Lower Court itself held
that in February, 1974, it did accept the offer — it approved the
sale to FMC, supra.
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can Savings and Loan Association is Not
Even Before the Court.
After assarting that this new offer should be considered over three months after FMC's offer was accepted, appellants objected to the documents memorializing their offer being received into evidence at the July
3, 1974 hearing. (Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 155-158.) FMC
proffered said documents so as to clarify for the Lower
Court that what appellants were loosely characterizing
as a "settlement" was nothing more than a new "13th
hour" offer and that in any event the "agreement" was
not sound. Thus, the so-called "settlement" is not even
part of the record and was never open to the light of
cross-examination due to the objection of the appellants.
As a matter of fact, the exhibit is sealed and can be
opened only by order of the Court. (Exh. 30, July 3,1974,
bearing.)
C. The Action of the Lower Court in Granting
the Receiver's Motion was Equitable and a
Proper Exercise of its Discretion.
The Lower Court properly exercised its discretion in
approving the Receiver's May 11,1974, Motion, aa^d such
was entirely justifiable upon principles of equity as well
as law:
The denial of the May 11, 1974, Motion of the
Receiver and/or preventing First Media and the
Receiver from concluding this matter would be
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unjust, inequitable, and would render proceedings under the statutes including § 16-10-92 (a) (i)
and 16-10-93 U. C. A. (1953), as amended, useless. (Conclusion of Law, R. 409.)
Appellants have not demonstrated in the slightest degree
wherein the Lower Court violated its discretion which
it clearly has under the relevant statute in granting the
Receiver's May 11 Motion,, or that it was arbitrary and
eapfricious.* The overwhelming evidence is to the contrary.
Not only did FMC secure contract rights, but also
rights of an equitable nature. In direct reliance on the
Count's acceptance of its offer, FMC expended nearly
$19,000 to conclude details incidental to the stale, including the taking of community ascertainment surveys necessary to the F.C.C. assignment process, besides relinquishing an opportunity to purchase another comparable AMFM radio property in Boise, Idaho. Failure to carry out
the terms of the FMC offer would be contrary not only
*Under the Utah Act (§ 16-10-92 et seq.), it is clearly provided that
when a termination of a receivership is sought, the burden of proof
rests with the moving party to establish the justification:
The liquidation of the assets and business of a corporation
may be discontinued . . . when it is established that cause
for liquidation no longer exist . . . (§ 16-10-96 U. C. A..)
(Emphasis added.)
Only if a cause for termination is established, then a court still has
discretion to decide whether or not to terminate because of the use
of the permissive "may," and not "shall." Of course, the discretion
does not exist if third party rights intervene, supra. Such discretion
is typical in Utah receiverships provided for instance by the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rudd v. International, 26 Utah 2d 263, 480 P.
2d 298 (1971).
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to sound equitable principles but also to the doctriiu if
promissory estoppel:
A promise which the promissor would reasonbly
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promissee and which does induce such action oar
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. (Restatement Contracts, Section 90.)
POINT II.
THE LONG FORM "AGREEMENT FOR THE
SALE AND PURCHASE OF ASSETS" IS
BASED UPON AND CONFORMS TO THE
COURT-ACCEPTED WRITTEN FMC OFFER, BUT WHETHER OR NOT IT DOES IS
NOT RELEVANT TO THE VESTING OF
RIGHTS IN FMC.
A. The Long Form "Agreement for the Sale
and Purchase of Assets" is Based Upon and
Conforms to the Written FMC Offer.
A careful reading and comparison of the detailed
FMC offer and the long form" Agreement for the Purchase
and Sale of Assets" evidences material consistency. A
mere difference in length in the documents does not evidence inconsistency, otherwise courts would be constrained to look with a jaundiced eye upon real estate
agreements which are substantially more detailed than
an earnest money receipt. As explained by the Receiver's
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counsel, the long form agreement is ". . . simply more
flesh on the bones." (Tr. June 7, 1974, p. 13.)
Essential contract elements are found in both the accepted FMC offer and the long form including:
1. Property to be sold is clearly set out in both.
2. The price is the same.*
3. The normal irepresentations called for in paragrap 6 of the FMC offer are consistent with the representations in the "long form."**
*It was suggested in Appellants' Brief at p. 45 that the provision
for an Indemnification Escrow of a portion of the purchase price
to be paid at closing was not consistent with FMC's offer. This provision is neither unreasonable nor inconsistent with paragraph 2 of
the accepted offer. The amount involved is precisely the same, and
the mechanical process of payment is the ". . . flesh on the bones."
The portion used to establish the Indemnification Escrow will not
in any way be under the control, dominion or supervision of FMC.
The distribution of the escrow is entirely within the control of the
Receiver and KOVO, Inc.
The Receiver has not represented that the escrow is a change.
One of the principal reasons for the provision is that the Receiver
stated that KOVO, Inc. could not provide the usual boilerplate warranty found in radio station purchase agreements that the financial
statements of KOVO, Inc. were prepared ". . . in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied . . ."
but could only represent that the financials were unaudited, and
to some extent based upon information prepared by those not necessarily skilled in accounting. Thus, the long form "Agreement for the
Sale and Purchase of Assets" as represented by the Receiver, as well
as similarly perceived by FMC, is consistent with the Court-accepted
short form offering document.
**The provision as to a consulting and non-competition agreement
with Shaw and Robison is not part of the long form per the directions of the Receiver as Shaw and Robison are not parties to this
long form "Agreement." (See Receiver's Motion, May 11, 1974, R.
187, Par. 3.)
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B. Robison and Shaw Were Provided an Opportunity to Comment on the Long Form and
Did Not Timely Suggest That it Differed in
any Material Way From the FMC Offer.
In his Motion of May 11, 1974, the Receiver states
that he attempted to obtain suggestions from Shaw and
Robison in preparation of the long form and to the extent
possible were incorporated (R. 186). The FMC offer
and the detailed explanation of it was of record, and no
claim or misunderstanding of the FMC offer could in
good faith be made at the hearings in June and July,
1974. In fact, the record shows that as far back as February 6, 1974, Robison's attorney in presenting Robison's
first offer represented to the Court that "Essentially as
far as the terms of the offer are concerned we are looking
at approximately the same type of an offer as presented
by FMC, if I can abbreviate it that way." (Tr. Feb. 6,
1974, p. 38.) He stated further, "Essentially the same
contingent paragraphs are in Mr. Robison's offer as were
present in the FMC." (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, p. 34.) Appellant's present argument that there is now some inconsistency is in furtherance of their attempt to become
new offerors after failing to have their offers accepted
during the orderly bid process.
C. Hie Receiver Represented to the Court and
FMC the Consistency of the Offer and Long
Form "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase
of Assets," and FMC Should Not Now Be
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Penalized if for Some Reason any Inconsistency is Shown,
The Court's Receiver* represented to the Court and
PMC that the long form and the written offer are consistent:
In the opinion of the Receiver, the agreement is
consistent with the initial offer and proposal
filed by First Media Corporation in this proceeding (R. 186). (Emphasis added.)
On June 7, 1974, in open court, Receiver's counsel
reaffirmed and reartkulated this basic position:
MR. ROBERTS (Counsel for Receiver): The
contract is essentially the contract — that is,
the same terms as contended by First Media's
offer simply with more flesh on the bones. There
aren't any major changes that I am aware of. It's
simply a matter of having worked out the various
exhibits in the contract language, but the format
is essentially what has been discussed since the
original offer. (Tr. June 7, 1974, p. 13.) (Emphasis added.)
If, for some reason, arguendo, it should be found
there is some material non-conformity, FMC should not
be penalized. Rather, the long form should be made
to conform to the short form, since the original accepted offer or short form constituted the basic agreement, and the long form was to be the more detailed min* Under Utah law a Receiver is an officer of the Court. Richins v.
Mitchell 19 Utah 2d 406 (1967).
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isiterial reflection thereof. Accordingly, any material variance would not vitiate the existence of a binding agreement represented by the short form or accepted offer;
supra. Analogous is the situation postulated by the Lower
Count, i.e., if a uniform real estate contract were found
to be different from an earnest money receipt, there would
still be a binding contract arising from a meeting of the
minds as per the earnest money receipt agreement. Similarly, if indeed any material difference exists between
the Agreement of the parties represented by the original
accepted offer and the long form document, the Court
should simply order that the one be required to conform
to the other.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Lower Court's action was
proper at both law and equity. Pursuant to and in full
reliance upon Court approved procedure for liquidation
after appointment of a Receiver, PMC made a detailed
written offer with a time limit for acceptance. With full
opportunity for bearing, the Lower Court accepted the
offer on February 22, 1974. Thereafter, the ministerial
details were to be concluded, including preparation of a
long form "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of
Assets." FMC went forward in reliance upon the integrity
of the court-ordered sale, changed its position and expended substantial sums and invested much time. The
resultant long form agreement which was tendered to the
Court as the final ministerial detail in the sale procedure
does in fact conform to the original FMC offer, as the
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Receiver so represented to the Court. If any material
difference were found to exist, however, the Court should
order conformity one with the other since FMC acted in
good faith in reliance upon the Receiver as to the basic
consisitency and conformity of the offer with the long
form.
It is submitted that the action of the Lower Court
in ordering the completion of the sale to FMC should be
affirmed.
DATED this 14th day of April, 1975.

CALLISTER, GREENE
& NEBEKER
J. Thomas Greene
GMford W. Price
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for
Intervenor-Respondent
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